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ARGUMENT 
L THE DISMISSAL OF OKELBERRY'S CLAIMS REGARDING STOCK 
OWNERSHIP WAS INAPPROPRIATE GIVEN THE PROCEDURAL 
POSTURE OF THIS CASE 
West Daniels first asserts that "a plain reading of . . . the Articles . . . confirms 
that there are no preconditions" for the ownership of West Daniels stock. In so 
arguing, West Daniels misstates the standard by which this analysis should have been 
conducted. Judge Schofield's ruling did not come by way of trial or even by way of 
summary judgment. Rather, Judge Schofield's ruling was in response to a rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See R. 
at 349. "[W]hen determining whether a trial court properly dismissed an action under 
rule 12(b)(6), we assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and we 
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Sony 
Electronics, Inc. v. Reben 2004 UT App 420, 110, 103 P.3d 186 (quotations and 
citations omitted). In such circumstances, "the complaint is liberally construed," and 
the court "is called upon to make a sympathetic perusal of the complaint." 61A 
Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 585 (2004) (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted). 
Such motions "are looked on with disfavor by the courts, and are granted sparingly 
and with care. The main reason for this disfavor is the basic precept that the primary 
objective of the law is to obtain a determination on the merits of the claim, and that 
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accordingly, a case should be tried on the proofs rather than on the pleadings, b i A 
Am Jur.2d Pleadings §582 (2004). 
IIL-IC, LIK •*:• .*. •*! ' ; -1 .; 4 •: ''-" l ti>,k in West Daniels 
"w'i i ; * h' [Forest Service] permits," that "the right to run cattle is necessary to 
be a member of the Association," and that members were not permitted to retain their 
shares of stock in West Daniels if they had 5oki U K , . ^w.waiui roiw. '-> via1 permit s, 
See Attachment I ^pprll ir \ i >| . i 'M *• ^-^- r~*- ourposes of this 
s^  allegations should have been regarded as true, regardless of whether 
there was some or even much evidence to the contrary. See 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleading 
at § 582 ("Even if it is doubtful that the plaintiff would ultimately pi e \ ail, ii th z 
plaintiff L>. .WIJL : liel, amot ion 
M. , . ' l.iil: i v to state a claim should not be granted."). For reasons of 
procedural posture alone, Judge Schofield's determination that there were no 
preconditions to ownership of West Daniels stock was simply incorrect. 
II. THERE IS N O "UNAMBIGUOLJS PROVISION" IN THE ARTICLES O F 
I N C O R P O R A T I O N T H A T PROHIBITS THE ESTABLISHMENT O F 
PRECONDITIONS FOR STOCK OWNERSHIP 
West Daniels continues to assert that there is a "completely unambiguous 
provision in the affidavit of incorporation'' indicating that there are no preconditions 
to ownership of West Daniels stock. What botn w OA ; Janice a.. - . :,. XH 1 • < *i • Li 
'have consistent! :.i • >--,. - L^- i r :!*. %< t i iLsof 
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Incorporation this "unambiguous provision" can be found. Judge Schofield did not 
specifically identify such a provision in either of his rulings, and West Daniels has not 
identified where this provision is found in any of its pleadings before this Court. 
A careful examination of the Articles, however, shows that there simply is no 
such provision. Instead, Judge Schofield appears to have concluded that, because the 
Articles do not say that there are preconditions to ownership of West Daniels stock 
(such as concurrent ownership of Forest Service permits), any language in the Bylaws 
imposing such a requirement is therefore unauthorized. This argument is not well 
founded. Though it is unquestionably true that provisions in a corporation's bylaws 
cannot conflict with any provisions in the articles of incorporation, it still does not 
follow that a provision in the bylaws is invalid if it goes beyond the scope of what is 
covered in the articles of incorporation themselves. In other words, if silence 
regarding a particular issue in the articles of incorporation is to be interpreted as 
barring all future regulation of that issue in the bylaws, then what would be the point 
of allowing bylaws at all? Rather than endorsing such a strained rule, this Court 
should instead note the obvious-that while a provision in the bylaws is invalid if it is 
contradicted by affirmative language in the articles of incorporation, a provision in the 
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bylaws is not invalidated simply because it fills the gaps left by the articles of 
incorporation's silence.1 
III. THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AND THE ACCEPTED 
CORPORATE PURPOSE BOTH INDICATE THAT THERE ARE 
PRECONDITIONS FOR STOCK OWNERSHIP IN WEST DANIELS. 
Judge Schofield's ruling in the present case is not only incorrect because of the 
Articles of Incorporation's failure to prohibit any preconditions for stock ownership, 
but also because the Articles of Incorporation actually provide the basis for the two 
preconditions for ownership that are at issue in this case. 
*In his January 2000 ruling (attached to West Daniels' reply brief as Attachment 
F), Judge Schofield did point out that there is a clear inconsistency between the vote 
allocation set forth in the Articles (which allows members one vote per share of stock) 
and the vote allocation set forth in the Bylaws (which allows members one vote per head 
of cattle). See kL at 113,8. To the extent that these provisions are in direct conflict, the 
vote allocations set forth in the Articles certainly control and the contrary provisions in 
the Bylaws would be invalid. The existence of this one particular conflict, however, 
should not be interpreted to mean that all other provisions in the Bylaws are also invalid. 
Otherwise, West Daniels would be left without any authoritative corporate document 
that would govern such necessary functions as the qualifications for Board membership 
(addressed in Bylaws, Article IV), the duties of the various officers (addressed in Bylaws, 
Articles VI and VII), the Board's powers to assess dues and assessment fees (addressed in 
the Bylaws, Article IX), and the rules for assembling a quorum and for corporate voting 
(Bylaws, Article XIII). Further, after hearing the evidence at the trial that was ultimately 
held on the other issues, Judge Eyre specifically found that "the Bylaws of the defendant 
Association received as Exhibit 2 have never been rescinded or amended." See West 
Daniels' Reply Brief, Exhibit C, 119. West Daniels has not challenged this finding; as 
such, under the law of this case, the remaining provisions in the Bylaws are still 
controlling and valid. 
Regardless, Judge Schofield's ruling and West Daniels' argument are explicitly 
based on the contention that there is a specific, unambiguous provision in the Articles 
that invalidates any precondition to stock ownership. Because this phantom provision 
has never been specifically identified, it simply cannot be relied upon here. 
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First, as was discussed more fully in the opening brief, the Articles of 
Incorporation state that "two shares shall be issued for each head of livestock." West 
Daniels now argues that this provision was only meant to apply to the initial 
distribution of stock after the formation of the Association. Using proper tools of 
contractual interpretation, however, this Court can and should hold that the provision 
is at the very least ambiguous, and that Okelberry was entitled to a trial as to whether 
this provision set forth preconditions for subsequent stock ownership in West Daniels. 
In considering the meaning of this provision, it is important to note that 
corporate charters and articles of incorporation are analyzed using the same rules of 
construction that apply to cases involving ordinary contracts. See Turner v. Hi-
Country Homeowners Ass'n. 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996); see also 18A 
Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 171 (stating that "the courts employ general principles of 
contract interpretation when construing articles of incorporation or a certificate of 
incorporation"); Bd. of Dirs. v. Bd. of Trs.. 798 A.2d 1068, 1079 n.12 (D.C.2002); State 
v. Delano Cmty. Dev. Corp.. 571 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 1997). Under standard 
rules of contractual interpretation, a question regarding the meaning of a particular 
contractual provision hinges on the parties' intent. "The underlying purpose in 
construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the 
contract. In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling." 
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WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp.. 2002 UT 88, 117, 54 P.3d 1139 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
If the court determines that the plain language of the contract is unambiguous, 
then the question of intent is deemed to be a question of law, and the court is 
empowered to issue a ruling as to the parties' contractual intent in a pre-trial motion. 
See Novell Inc. v. The Canopy Group. Inc.. 2004 UT App 162, f20, 92 P.3d 768. On 
the other hand, the interpretation of an ambiguous provision presents a question of 
fact that should be resolved only at trial-and not in a pre-trial motion for dismissal or 
summary judgment. See WebBank. 2002 UT 88 at 122 ("When ambiguity exists, the 
intent of the parties becomes a question of fact. A motion for summary judgment may 
not be granted if . . . there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended."); Canyon 
Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch County. 2001 UT App 414, 125, 40 P.3d 
1148 (stating that where contractual language is deemed "ambiguous . . . then 
determining the meaning of . . . the clause would not be suitable for summary 
judgment and instead should be an issue for trial."); 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 332 
(2004) ? 
2Notably, several courts have specifically held that this transformation from a 
question of law to a question of fact occurs even in cases where a corporate charter is at 
issue. See, e.g.. Bd. of Dirs. 798 A.2d at 1079 n.12; Ferrill v. North American Hunting 
Retriever Ass'n. Inc.. 795 A.2d 1208, 1211-12 (Vt. 2002). 
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Under Utah law, a provision is deemed to be ambiguous if the provision is 
"capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." WebBank, 2002 UT 88 at i[20. If 
both parties "present[] contrary but plausible interpretations of the language at issue," 
then the provision is deemed to be ambiguous. Canyon Meadows Home Owners 
Assji, 2001 UT App 414 at if21. As discussed above, neither Judge Schofield nor West 
Daniels have pointed to any particular provision from the Articles of Incorporation 
that specifically disallows the establishment of preconditions for stock ownership. 
Instead, West Daniels now simply argues that the Articles of Incorporation's insistence 
that "two shares shall be issued for each head of livestock" was limited in effect to the 
"method of initial stock distribution" (emphasis added). 
Contrary to West Daniels' suggestion, however, the word "initial" doesn't 
appear in the provision itself, and there is nothing else in that provision that expressly 
indicates that the two share/head rule was to limited to that initial offering. As such, a 
trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the Article's statement that "two shares 
shall be issued for each head of livestock" was also intended to regulate the amount of 
stock that would be issued whenever new members joined the Association, and that it 
was also intended to govern the distribution and reallocation of stock whenever 
current members received permission to graze additional cattle on Association land. 
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Indeed, prior to having this issue dismissed by Judge Schofield, Okelberry was 
prepared to present evidence indicating that ownership of shares of stock in the 
Association has until recently been limited to members who were grazing livestock. 
Under the terms of Upland Industries Corporation v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 
684 P.2d 638 (Utah 1984), the Association's longstanding pattern of conduct would 
have been highly significant in determining the precise meaning behind the challenged 
provision. See kL at 642 (holding that the "construction given to [a contractual 
provision] by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before 
any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when 
reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the court5'); see also Younger v. Wisdom 
Society. 175 Cal.Rptr. 542, 547 (Cal.Ct. App. 2d Dist. Div. 4 1981) (stating that, when 
interpreting a corporation's articles of incorporation, "the court could consider the 
corporation's actual conduct and method of operation"); Bd. of Directors, 798 A.2d at 
1080 (same); Acadian Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Cameron, 119 S.W.3d 290, 302 (Tex. 
App 2003) (same); Shafer v. Bd. of Trustees of Sandy Hook Yacht Club Estates, Inc., 
883 P.2d 1387, 1393 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (same); 18A Am.Jur. 2d Corporations § 170 
(stating that, "the court may take into consideration the actual conduct of the 
corporation and its method of operation" when interpreting a provision in the articles 
of incorporation). Because of Judge Schofield's premature dismissal, however, this 
evidence has not yet been presented to the court. 
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The prospective nature of the two share/head provision is further plausible 
when considered alongside the overriding purpose of this particular corporation. See 
18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 175 (2004) ("It has been said that the purposes clause is 
the real measure of a corporation's authority, and it predominates over a powers 
clause, which only describes the general powers granted by the law to all corporations 
of a particular kind, plus those granted by the approval of its specific charter."). As 
discussed more fully in the opening brief, West Daniels was formed by a group of 
cattlemen and ranchers who wanted to pool their resources in order to collectively 
purchase and manage grazing lands for their own individual herds. As was also 
discussed, the forage-supply on the West Daniels land is limited, thereby also 
restricting the number of cattle that could graze on the land during any given season. 
It is in large part because of these natural limitations that there was such a 
pronounced link between the number of cattle that a member was grazing and the 
amount of stock that the member was allowed to own in the Association itself. As 
indicated in the Complaint, the Association has traditionally run 695 head of cattle on 
its property. Under these conditions, a member who was being permitted to graze 347 
cattle on the Association's property would, in a very literal way, have a 50% interest in 
the management decisions of the West Daniels Association. If that same member 
reduced his or her herd to 150 cattle in a subsequent year, however, it would make 
sense to then require the member to relinquish those shares, insofar as that member no 
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longer had the same degree of interest in the Association's grazing activities.3 In this 
manner, tying the amount of stock that a member could own to the amount of cattle 
that the member was currently grazing was a logical way of keeping control of the 
corporation in the hands of those who actually had a personal interest in making wise 
and proper grazing decisions. It was also a way of preventing the Association from 
being overtaken by non-grazing investors- who would by definition be inclined to 
manage the land with an eye towards profit-maximization, rather than grazing-
regulation. 
It is also for this reason that the Forest Service permits were so uniformly 
considered to be part and parcel of the shares of stock in West Daniels. Though it is 
certainly true, as West Daniels has suggested, that members could have chosen to graze 
3West Daniels contends that this would lead to the "absurd" result of requiring 
shareholders to relinquish shares in the event of "drought or disease." This assertion is 
incorrect. If a 100-head member lost 50 head due to drought or disease, that member 
would presumably be replacing those 50 head in the subsequent season. As such, the 
member's interest in the corporation would stay the same, and he or she would properly 
retain his or her stock. Such a scenario would be no different than that which would face 
the Association if a particular member had a certain number of his or her herd sold and 
slaughtered. Presumably, that member would then be replacing those cattle with new 
head during the coming season. The point here is that the grazing permits and the 
associated voting rights don't attach to a particular cow, but rather to the member's own 
continued intent to graze that same number of cattle on Association lands. 
There is a stark difference between these situations, however, and one in which 
the 100-head member instead simply chooses to reduce his or her herd for business or 
personal reasons. In this scenario, the member's interest in the Association as a grazing-
oriented body is clearly no longer the same, and it is for this reason that the Articles of 
Incorporation implicitly allow for the reduction of that individual's stock ownership. 
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their cattle on a different range during the summer season, the reality is that this 
simply was not occurring. As indicated in footnote 12 of Okelberry's opening brief, 
one of West Daniels5 own witnesses stated at trial that he couldn't think of one 
instance prior to 1990 in which the Forest Service permits were not transferred 
alongside the shares of stock in West Daniels. As discussed above, this decades-long 
pattern of conduct is highly significant in terms of interpreting the provisions of the 
Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws, and Okelberry should have been allowed to 
have developed it and presented it at trial. 
In this manner, West Daniels' protestations that Okelberry is attempting to 
"gain a windfall increase in his ownership share . . . by inventing ownership 
requirements out of thin air" could not be further from the truth. It is not Okelberry 
who is attempting to "gain a windfall increase" here. Rather, it is the shareholders in 
West Daniels who no longer own their Forest Service permits, who are no longer 
grazing cattle on West Daniels land, and yet who are still claiming the right to exercise 
control over what is by charter supposed to be a non-profit grazing cooperative. As 
evidenced by their decisions to lease out the land to a non-shareholder and then 
explore the possibilities for selling that land, those members now have nothing more 
than a financial interest in this land as a piece of property, with this interest running 
directly contrary the Articles of Incorporation's insistence that it be reserved for the 
grazing of the members' cattle. 
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Thus, rather than constructing the membership requirements "out of thin air," 
Okelberry is simply asking that the stock allocation system that was set forth in the 
Articles of Incorporation continue to be adhered to. At the very least, Ray Okelberry 
simply wants the opportunity to present his evidence regarding the meaning of the 
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws to a trier of fact. 
In short, this is a complicated corporate problem that can only properly be 
resolved through a careful examination of the evidence regarding the intent of the 
corporate framers-as well as through a detailed look at the meaning of the 
corporation's charter, as evidenced by the subsequent decades of conduct by the 
Association members. Judge Schofield improperly resolved this dispute without 
allowing Okelberry to develop and present that evidence. This decision was in error. 
DATED this J _ day of March, 2005. 
DON R. PETERSEN and 
RYAN D. TENNEY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
PAGE 12 OF 13 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this f day of March, 2005. 
Bradley R. Cahoon 
Wade R. Budge 
Peter H. Donaldson 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
I \Okelberry Ray 25774-l\West DanielsXreply brief wpd 
PAGE 13 OF 13 
